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In the pages of the Bulletin of Peace Proposals
and other journals, we have seen a remarkably
diverse and original range of proposals that
might help to slow down or reverse the Soviet-
American arms race. For reasons too numerous
and complex to reiterate here, little progress
has been made. On the contrary, we now find
ourselves in a particularly frantic and ex-
tremely dangerous phase of this long and costly
competition in strategic weapons. It may be,
however, that political reason is more likely to
return when things look most menacing, and
that today’s sorry state of affairs will itself help
to stimulate more rational and prudent behavior
on the part of the super powers. In this brief
note, let me itemize a number of initiatives that
could (and should) be taken by one or both of
those regimes, after first making explicit cer-
tain of the more relevant assumptions from
which these proposals flow.
Some strategic assumptions
Despite some mischievous and ill-informed
suggestions to the contrary, there is no doubt
that what we have here is a full-fledged arms
race, going back to the 1940s. By this, I mean
that a large part of the driving force behind
each side’s military procurement is the type
and quantity of the other’s. There is no ques-
tion that an arms race in the industrial age also
requires a great deal of domestic amplification
- and much of my proposal here will address
that problem - but there must also be a genuine
adversary who has threatening capabilities and
apparently hostile intentions. Similarly, there
must be within both societies such a distribu-
tion of power - economic and political - that it
is more ’natural’ to exaggerate the other side’s
capabilities and belligerence than to estimate
these elements accurately. This propensity to-
ward ’worst-case analysis’ may be an inherent
part of all national states, but it requires a fair
amount of time and some degree of evidence
before it becomes the dominant viewpoint, and
advocates of self-correcting policies become
overwhelmed by those who advocate self-
amplifying foreign and military policies.
In addition, then, to the assumption that the
super powers are in a bona fide arms race - as
well as an enduring rivalry - there is the
equally crucial assumption that both societies
are less secure today than when the arms race
began. Both may even be in greater jeopardy
than at any previous time, including perhaps
the Soviet Union when it was dramatically
inferior to the US in strategic capabilities. This
increased jeopardy comes, as I see it, from: a)
the technological innovations that have been
pursued and applied; and b) from the strategic
doctrines that have been adopted in response to
the changing weapons technology. Under the
first category, we have in mind such ’im-
provements’ as accuracy and range of delivery
vehicles, miniaturization and yield of
warheads, and perhaps most de-stabilizing of
all, development of the MIRV and MARV
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multiple warhead capability.
As if these innovations were not dangerous
enough in themselves, both the US and the
USSR have gradually succumbed to the
targeting temptations that they offer. No one
would suggest that a doctrine of mutual assured
destruction is a rational or humanly acceptable
basis for national security, but compared to the
alternatives that have been gradually embraced
by the increasingly powerful ’hawks’ in both
societies, MAD now looks like the epitome of
reason and prudence. That is, we now see
these two governments opting for highly pro-
vocative and de-stabilizing strategies under
such terms as ‘damage-limiting’ , war-fighting,
flexible response, and counter-force
capabilities. Briefly put, as each side’s land
based missile systems become more vulnerable
via the application of the new technologies,
each amplified that danger - in the name of
nullifying it - by also increasing the number of
such systems, either on their own territories or
on that of allies. Today, each side’s nuclear
arsenal has a much weaker deterrent-to-provo-
cation ratio than at any time in the past, and
the situation is clearly getting worse.
A third assumption that is critical to the
analysis presented here is that the Western
powers and the US in particular have re-
sponded to the Soviet strategic build up in the
least adaptive manner. In order to deter a
possible Soviet adventure in Europe and to
provide reassurance to the allies, the US could
have pushed for some modest improvements in
the size, firepower, and organization of
NATO’s conventional capabilities. But per-
suaded that conscription would be unacceptable
in the US (a very dubious premise, given the
steady support of about 60 vs 35 percent op-
posed in the opinion polls to some type of
draft), that similar efforts would be opposed in
Western Europe, and that theatre nuclear deliv-
ery systems stationed there would be an assur-
ing sign of the American commitment, the
West has gone for the most de-stabilizing re-
sponse to the putative Soviet threat.
Some socio-political assumptions
Shifting now from the military to the domestic
social scene, let me articulate several addi-
tional assumptions. The first of these is that
both the Soviet and American regimes are
already in serious trouble at home, along with
their declining prestige and influence abroad.
Neither regime is meeting the basic needs of
large sectors of the respective societies, and as
the economic, ethnic, and quality of life prob-
lems get more severe, there will be increas-
ingly vigorous demands for attention and re-
sources. And we will probably see more opin-
ion leaders and political officials begin to sup-
port, in public as well as in private, these
demands. Clearly, the guns versus butter issue
is becoming more and more salient throughout
the world, and in such diverse societies as the
USA and USSR, not to mention the Third and
Fourth worlds.
Furthermore, I assume that military spending
- especially on strategic systems - is economi-
cally detrimental to both societies. It is not
only inflationary for all the obvious reasons but
it also inhibits industrial research and de-
velopment, productivity, quality control, and
effective competition in the export market. To
the extent that journalists, scholars, and politi-
cians become aware of the economic con-
sequences of strategic arms spending, they can
be expected to advocate measures that might
reduce that spending.
Finally, all sorts of indicators suggest that
the attentive publics in East and West Europe,
North America, and perhaps in the USSR are
increasingly aware of both the increasing prob-
ability of nuclear war and the physical con-
sequences. Opinion surveys show as many as
70% believing that such a war is likely in the
next five years, and the growing resistance to
civil defense programs, fallout shelters, and
evacuation plans suggests an awareness that
passive defense systems are a deceptive fraud.
About two years ago, in this connection, the
American CIA released its report on Soviet
civil defense, indicating that it would be no
more effective in protecting the general public
(as distinct from the top political elites) than
would the US system, further weakening sup-
port for that program at home.
In sum, public and elite concern over the
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strategic arms race is clearly on the rise in
many parts of the world, and resistance seems
to be growing apace. This, then, creates an
opportunity and an incentive for some new
initiatives designed to slow down and reverse
this vertical - and thus, horizontal - prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapon capabilities. Space
limitations preclude full articulation here, and I
therefore end this brief essay with a simple
listing of some useful initiatives that might be
taken not only by one or both super powers,
but by their allies and by the governments of
the non-aligned states as well.
Some critical initiatives
1. US should accept the oft-urged SU com-
mitment to ’no first use’ of any nuclear
weapons, beginning if need be with
strategic and theater, expanding commit-
ment to tactical as NATO conventional
forces are improved. A joint US-SU de-
claration the preferred vehicle.
2. Accompany (and/or precede) such decla-
ration with a serious educational program
clarifying the advantages and dangers of
no-first-use doctrine.
3. Begin first phase of dismantling US land-
based ICBMs (Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missiles), including a freeze on MX
(highly accurate ICBM) production and
deployment.
4. If not previously negotiated, encourage SU
to emulate US phase-out process, even if
at slower pace (given their greater ’re-
liance’ on landbased systems). Seek
negotiated schedule, preferably extending
to air-launched and sea-launched warheads
in that order.
5. As part of the strategic phase-out, US
should offer to sell several older SLBM
(Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles)
systems to SU, to give them approximate
parity in terms of survivable and essen-
tially retaliatory capacity.
6. Propose freeze on theater nuclear-tipped
missiles, but retain air launched (including
carrier forces) until negotiations concluded
and missile phase-out is well under way.
7. Re-examine the 1950s proposals of
Rapacki, Kennan, and others for a Euro-
pean disengagement and/or de-nucleariza-
tion system.
8. Transfer part of the funds and personnel
saved by nuclear phase-out and deactiva-
tion and dismantling to increase US con-
ventional capabilities in Europe and in
some version of a rapid deployment force.
In Europe, more emphasis on organiza-
tion, coordination, standardization, and on
weapons that have demonstrably greater
defensive than offensive capacities. Alter-
natively, re-invigorate the MBFR (Mutual
Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations,
or some combination.
9. Early on, institute a substantial economic
conversion program, including education,
training, investment, tax breaks, etc. Take
up employment slack by, for example,
re-building canal and railroad systems in
both nations.
10. Develop domestic socio-political conver-
sion programs that will reward non-milit-
ary allocations and those elements that
effectively push for demilitarization and
humanization of both societies.
11. Allocate some of the saved resources and
personnel to economic development prog-
rams - under UN auspices - in third and
fourth world societies.
12. Develop, examine, and advocate stronger
UN or supra-national institutions and pro-
cedures for arms inspection, monitoring,
peace-keeping, conflict-settlement, and
economic/social development. Establish
UN peace observation agency, utilizing
indicators of hardware and personnel de-
activation as well as of psychological and
socio-economic demobilization.
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